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Abstract:  With rapidly rising health care costs, the goal of attracting and retaining the most 
productive employees to offset the rising cost of employee benefits has become more important 
than ever. In this paper, we evaluate empirically the importance of worker selection into jobs 
with different combinations of fringe benefits and how this impacts mobility and wage 
outcomes. More precisely, we use a framework in which a worker’s decision to move into a job 
with or without benefits is based on his or her comparative advantage with respect to skills, 
health status, and unobserved individual-specific traits; we account for a broader set of fringe 
benefits than health insurance, including whether a worker gets a retirement plan, paid sick 
leave, or paid vacation and we exploit richer information on health insurance to distinguish 





I.  Introduction 
 
Since the 1950s, fringe benefits, including employer-provided retirement plans, health insurance, 
paid time off, and sick leave have become an increasingly important part of workers’ compensation.   
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2007 Employer Costs for Employee Compensation 
Survey, among private establishments, fringe benefits accounted for approximately 29.3% of total 
compensation  (U.S.  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  2008).    While  employer-provided  benefits  are 
costly, firms may offset these costs through lower wages, implying a predicted, inverse relationship 
between wages and non-wage benefits.  
 
The idea of a tradeoff between wages and employer-provided benefits has long been accepted 
from a theoretical standpoint (Woodbury, 1983).  However, there is much less agreement within 
the empirical literature as to whether such a tradeoff exists.
1 Most studies that have used worker-
level data do not find evidence of a negative compensating differential. Rather than finding the 
predicted inverse relationship between wages and benefits, these studies instead find no relationship 
or a positive relationship. A common interpretation of this finding emphasizes the role of worker 
selection whereby firms may recoup the cost of fringe benefits through attracting and retaining more 
productive workers. As a result, the estimated tradeoff is contaminated by an ability bias. 
 
In this paper, we are interested in empirically testing the importance of worker selection into jobs 
with or without benefits and its impact on wages and mobility outcomes. We revisit the question of 
compensating wage differentials associated with fringe benefits using an empirical approach which, 
in addition to estimating the effect of fringe benefits on the level of wages (the tradeoff), evaluates 
empirically the impact of worker selection into jobs with or without benefits on the structure of 
wages. With increasing costs of fringe benefits, in particular health insurance, analyzing the nature 
and testing the importance of worker selection can provide valuable insights to the evaluation of the 
cost of employer-provided benefits. 
 
Cross-sectional studies have been limited in addressing the problem of worker selection stemming 
from  the  correlation  between  unobserved  ability  and  the  receipt  of  a  particular  fringe  benefit. 
Recognizing  this  limitation,  more  recent  work  has  utilized  a  variety  of  study  designs  and 
econometric techniques, including instrumental variables (Olson, 2002, Jensen and Morrisey, 2001), 
natural experiments (Gruber, 1994; Adams, 2007), and panel data methods in an attempt to control 
for individual-specific, time-invariant  unobserved effects (Miller, 2004, Simon, 2001, Levy and 
Feldman, 2001). However, in many instances, these studies still have not found robust evidence of a 
tradeoff.
2  One possibility is that the estimated relationship between fringe benefit receipt and wages 
may be  contaminated if unobserved individual heterogeneity is time -varying.     For example, a 
worker may search for and switch to a job that better matches his ability  and skills, both of which 
are likely to vary over a worker’s career.
3 In this case, a change in the receipt of non-wage benefits 
                                                 
1 See Currie and Madrian (1999) for a literature review and a discussion about the empirical debate on the wage-health insurance tradeoff and 
Morrisey (2002) for a discussion of issues in the empirical literature on compensating wage differentials. Most studies focus on health insurance 
or on only one benefit. Montgomery, Shaw and Benedict (1992) find a negative trade-off between wages and pension level in the contractual 
model they estimate. Baughman, DiNardi and Holtz-Eakin (2003) find some evidence of wage reduction associated with the offering of family-
friendly practices. Altonji and Usui (2007) find a positive association between hourly wages and paid vacation.   
2 Exceptions to this include Gruber and Krueger (1991) who find evidence of  an offset for workers’ compensation insurance, Gruber (1994), 
who looks at the effect of mandated maternity coverage on the wages of women of childbearing age, Miller (2004) who finds an offset equal to 
10-11 percent of wages, and Adams (2007) who looks at the effect of a change in premium rating for the small group market in New York. 
3 Ability may not be perfectly observed and workers and firms build expectations about it conditional on past observations of t he worker’s 
productivity. Expected ability evolves over time following the evolution of worker productivity. A similar argument could be applied to 
unobserved heterogeneity coming from individual differences in preferences for benefits. Such preferences may not be known and individuals 




between the old job and new job may still be correlated with a change in the unobserved ability of 
the worker and the presence of worker selection stemming from endogenous worker mobility is still 
affecting the estimates (Gibbons and Katz, 1992).   
 
While this example represents a labor supply-side effect, there may also be a response from the 
demand-side, whereby skills and unobserved ability are differently rewarded by firms according 
to whether or not they offer fringe benefits.  Workers may not be  identically productive across 
jobs  or benefit  sectors,  defined  as  groups of jobs  classified by  whether total  compensation 
includes or does not include particular fringe benefits, and may have a comparative advantage 
in some jobs or sectors based on skills, health status, and unobserved ability. As a result of non-
random selection and the mobility of workers into different benefit sectors, the wage-health 
insurance tradeoff cannot be fully addressed by simply employing fixed-effects analysis.    
 
The analysis in this paper extends the literature on compensating wage differentials associated 
with fringe benefits by specifically analyzing the nature and importance of worker selection into 
firms  that  offer  or  do  not  offer  fringe  benefits.  In  contrast  to  previous  studies  which  have 
focused mainly on the level effects of benefits, particularly health insurance, on wages, our 
approach empirically evaluates the importance of worker selection into jobs with or without 
benefits through an estimation of its effect on wages in terms of the returns to holding a job 
with benefits. While the issue of worker selection into jobs with benefits is not new, especially 
in the literature stream focusing on health insurance, empirical evidence of its importance is 
sparse.
4 To our knowledge, the only paper that empirically analyzes worker selection is Lehrer 
and Pereira (2007) who show that worker selection into jobs with health insurance has taken on 
increasing importance in explaining the wage inequality in the United States.  
 
The empirical model builds on an extended version of the Mincer  wage equation with benefit 
dummies to capture the compensating wage differentials (or the level effects).  We augment this 
equation by including interactions of the benefit indicators with skills and health status. The 
interaction terms represent the returns to skills and health status by benefit sectors. Significantly 
different returns to skills and/or health status across benefit sectors suggests that workers with 
given levels of skills and health status have a comparative advantage in a particular benef it 
sector and select into it accordingly. The complete selection model assumes that worker sorting 
and mobility decisions across benefit sectors are driven by the worker’s unobserved individual 
specific traits, for example preferences for benefits or ability.  This model addresses the main 
issue that has limited prior work: endogeneity in worker mobility across firms. Several recent 
studies  have  adopted  this  approach,  analyzing  sector-specific  wage  differentials,  whereby 
sectors are defined by union status (Lemieux, 1998), industries and occupations (Gibbons Katz, 
Lemieux and Parent, 2005), job ranks (Lluis, 2005) and firm size (Ferrer and Lluis, 2008).    
 
Furthermore, our analysis revisits the issue of the tradeoff between wages and health insurance 
by taking into account additional variables likely to affect the tradeoff. In particular, we include 
measures to capture the effect of other forms of non-wage compensation.  This is important if 
                                                 
4 To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence of worker sorting in the pension literature (or other fringe benefits such as paid vacation or 
sick leave). However, pension as deferred compensation and its implications in terms of worker selection has been discussed theoretically: 
pension attracts stayers (Lazear, 1990) or savers (Ippolito, 2002).  Some empirical evidence is found in the health insurance literature which 
shows that workers with low preferences for health insurance are disproportionately employed in firms that do not offer coverage (Marquis and 




firm compensation policies and a worker’s decision to join a firm are based on wages and the 
full set of benefits, including health insurance, retirement plans, paid vacation, and sick leave. 
We also consider the influence of a worker’s health status (in addition to skills) as well as 
changes  in  health  status  on  wages  and  mobility.  Health  status  has  been  found  to  have  a 
significant impact on employment and wages (Pelkowski and Berger, 2004, Kapur, Escarce, 
Marquis and Simon, 2005). We also explicitly account for differences between workers who 
have an offer of health insurance and do not hold the coverage relative to those who are offered 
coverage and hold it. This allows us to test for whether the incidence is specific to only those 
who hold insurance coverage.  Due to data limitations, prior work has not been able to fully 
account for these other components of compensation and for the health status of the worker.  
 
The methodology in our paper is closely related to Lehrer and Pereira (2007), who also consider 
the possibility of both supply and demand-side effects of health insurance provision on wages 
and estimate a wage equation in which skills (including ability) are differentially rewarded by 
whether  a  worker  receives  health  insurance  or  not.  Although  their  estimation  methodology 
permits identification of the returns to ability by health insurance sector while treating health 
insurance  choice  as  endogenous,  their  data  from  the  displaced  workers  supplement  of  the 
Current  Population  Survey  (CPS)  limits  their  ability  to  apply  a  more  general  estimation 
framework  which  addresses  the  issue  of  endogeneity  with  respect  to  workers’  mobility 
decisions. Moreover, the CPS only provides information on health insurance, while worker and 
firm decisions likely depend on other benefits as well (Jensen and Morrisey, 2001).
5 We also 
extend their analysis by estimating the specific role that a worker’s health status plays in his or 
her selection and mobility across benefit sectors and how this affects wage outcomes.     
 
In this study, we use information from the Household Component of the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey (MEPS) for the years 1997-2006.  The MEPS is a rich data source, providing 
information about workers, characteristics of the establishment(s) at which they are employed 
over time, and details of their compensation, including wages and the availability of health 
insurance, a retirement plan, paid vacation, and paid sick leave.  Our sample is restricted to 
individuals aged 19 to 64 who work full time throughout the sample period. We further select 
individuals who are not married (e.g., single, divorced or widowed) in order to remove the 
additional  complexity  that  results  from  spousal  health  insurance  on  employment  decisions 
(Dranove, Spier and Baker, 2000, Royalty and Abraham, 2006). To minimize errors in reporting 
benefits between two consecutive periods, we replicate the analysis of the structure of wages by 
benefits sector over the sample of job changers.  
 
Our  empirical  strategy  exploits  information  on  worker  mobility  decisions  to  quantify  the 
relative  importance  of  worker  selection  based  on  observable  skills,  health  status  and 
unobservable  ability.  We  then  test  for  the  existence  of  compensating  wage  differentials  after 
controlling for the presence of these various sources of selection effects. Overall, we find strong 
evidence  of  the  importance  of  worker  selection  into  jobs  with  or  without  benefits  where  the 
selection is based on skills, health status and individual-specific traits. In particular, we find that 
workers with greater skills and health status are more likely to be holding jobs with the full set of 
benefits. Moreover, we find that among job changers, healthier worker are less likely to seek a job 
                                                 
5 Their main objective is to analyze changes in the wage-health insurance relationship over time and how these changes have influenced wage 




that offers health insurance but more likely to switch to a job that offers health insurance if they 
experienced  a  negative  health  shock  during  the  previous  period.  Furthermore,  worker  selection 
significantly  affects  the  wage  structure  by  benefit  sectors.  The  results  differ  depending  upon 
whether health insurance is offered as the only benefit available or whether it is complemented by 
other benefits. We find evidence of greater returns to skills and health in firms that offer the full set 
of benefits including health insurance and evidence of negative selection based on health status in 
firms that only offer health insurance.  
 
The  results  regarding  the  tradeoff  are  sensitive  to  the  sample  of  workers  studied.  While  no 
significant tradeoff is found for the main sample of workers, there is evidence of a positive wage 
premium in  firms  that  offer  other  benefits  (whether  complemented  or  not by  health insurance) 
among the sample of job changers, even after controlling for worker selection based on skills, health 
status and individual-specific traits. Regarding group incidence of health insurance we find that 
although  the  wage  differentials  associated  with  holding  and  being  offered  health  insurance  are 
different, the difference disappears after controlling for worker selection.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data, measures, and selection of our 
sample. In section III, we estimate the wage differentials associated with health insurance along 
the line of prior studies, augmenting the wage equation with a set of variables to capture the 
provision of non-wage benefits offered to workers. In section IV, we present the endogenous 
sector choice methodology and the empirical specification that we use to obtain results for the 
estimated effects of benefits on wages, taking account of worker selection based on observable 
and unobservable skills. Section V provides concluding remarks. 
  




We use the Household Component (HC) of the 1997-2006 MEPS, which is an annual survey 
fielded by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. The MEPS-HC sample is drawn from respondents to the National Health 
Interview Survey, and provides a nationally representative sample of the non-institutionalized 
civilian population of the United States.  The MEPS contains individual and household-level 
data  on  employment,  health  insurance  coverage,  other  employer-provided  benefits, 
demographic characteristics and health status. The survey uses an overlapping panel design 




The  MEPS  collects  several  employment  and  compensation  measures,  including  each 
individual’s hourly wage rate ($2003) for his current main job in each round. Surveyors top-
coded all wage rates above the 99
th percentile and then recoded these to the maximum reported 
value  (99
th  percentile).    In  addition  to  wages,  the  MEPS  also  asked  each  worker  about 
employer-provided benefits. With respect to health insurance, we define two indicator variables.  
The  first  of  these  captures  whether  a  worker  has  an  offer  of  health  insurance  through  his 




captures whether a worker has an offer and holds that coverage (EHI Held).  The reference 
category captures a worker not having an offer of health insurance.    
 
The MEPS also collects information about whether a worker reports having a retirement plan, 
paid vacation, and paid sick leave as part of total compensation.  We define binary indicators 
for each of these other benefits, as well as an index measure, defined as the sum of the binary 
indicators.  Given the panel format of the data, it is possible to track workers over time as they 
change jobs and move to a job that may provide a different combination of wage and non-wage 
compensation.  
 
The  MEPS  contains  two  variables  relating  to  firm  size:  the  number  of  employees  at  the 
establishment and a binary indicator for whether the firm has more than one location. Other 
employment characteristics include the worker’s job tenure (years), whether the worker is a 
member of a union, and a set of binary indicators for one digit SIC industry and occupation 
categories.  
 
In addition to the compensation and employment variables, we define a set of measures to 
capture a worker’s demographic and human capital attributes. These measures include age, age-
squared, years of education, race, gender, and a five-category measure of self-reported health 
status.
6    While  this  measure  of  self -reported  health  status  likely  contains  measurement, 
researchers have found that it correlates highly with actual health (Butler, Burkhauser, Mitchell 
and Pincus, 1987).  Since  there may be variation in the provision of  wages and  benefits 
geographically and over time, we also include four geographic region dummies (Northeast, 
Midwest, South, West [excluded]) and an indicator for a worker residing in a metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA).  Finally, we include y ear and round indicator variables to control for 
time trends. 
 
Estimation Samples:  
 
We focus our attention on individuals who are employed full-time, defined as working at least 
30 hours per week for each of the five survey rounds.  Additionally, we restrict our sample to 
those individuals who are not married, although they may have dependent children. We also 
exclude individuals who receive health insurance through other sources (public or private) than 
their own employer. The number of person-round observations in our primary sample is 30,098, 
corresponding to 9,403 unique workers. Table 1 in Appendix A provides summary statistics for 
the primary sample of workers. 
 
In addition to our primary sample, we define a sub-sample of job changers, which includes 
those individuals who report changing jobs at least once during the two-year period.  In the 
MEPS, surveyors asked each worker about whether he or she changed jobs between consecutive 
rounds.  Using a worker’s response to this question, we are able to identify the sample of job 
changers as well as the round in which the job change took place.  This sub-sample is valuable 
because we can be more confident that an observed change in benefits reflects a “true” change 
and not a potential reporting error.  This sample contains 3,202 workers who reported at least 
one job change between two consecutive rounds.  
                                                 





We also have information on the type of job change. We classify involuntary job changes as 
arising  from  the  following  reasons:  “business  dissolved”  and  “lay-off".
7  Focusing  on 
involuntary job changes which result from an exogenous shock, allows us to further control for 
factors related to unobserved ability or taste for benefits that could affect mobility and wages in 
the new job.  
 
Our analysis in the next section is divided into three parts: 1) an analysis of the wage effects of 
being offered or holding health insurance as well as being offered other benefits using the 
empirical strategy commonly adopted in the  literature on compensating wage differentials, 2) 
an analysis of the effects of skills and health status on workers’ choice of and mobility into jobs 
with benefits to confirm the relevance of these two factors in determining worker selection 
across benefit sectors and 3) an analysis of  the returns to skills and health status across the 
different  combinations  of  health  insurance  and  benefits  offered  to  evaluate  empirically  the 
importance of worker selection effects based on skills, health and unobserved individual traits. 
Note, our analyses use sampling weights provided in the MEPS. 
 
III.  Wage Differentials Associated with Health insurance and Other Benefits 
 
In  this  section,  we  replicate  the  methodology  in  the  literature  estimating  compensating 
differentials in order to compare the results using the MEPS data to those obtained from other 
panel  datasets  and  to  analyze  whether  and  how  the  estimated  differentials  vary  when 
distinguishing health insurance offered and held as well as adding information on the provision 
of other benefits.  
    
Consistent with the empirical literature on compensating differentials, we adopt a Mincer wage 
equation framework in which an individual’s log of hourly wage is a function of human capital 
variables, including years of education, age and job tenure (levels and quadratics).  We also 
include job and firm characteristics, such as occupation, industry, establishment size (in logs), 
and whether the individual is  a union  member.  Finally, we control  for geographic region, 
residence in an MSA, year and round dummies.  
 
We augment the wage equation with two measures of health insurance: EHI Held (implying a 
worker  is  offered  coverage  and  holds  it)  and  EHI  Offered  (implying  a  worker  is  offered 
coverage but does not take it up).  The reference category is not having an offer of health 
insurance  as  part  of  compensation.    Also,  we  include  three  binary  indicator  variables  for 
whether a worker has a retirement plan, paid vacation, and paid sick leave to capture other 
components of compensation. 
 
The first column of Table 1 provides parameter estimates and standard errors for a simple OLS 
specification of log wages, including the two health insurance measures.  In column (2), we add 
the three benefit indicators to the specification. In the third column, we modify the way in 
which we control for the presence of other benefits by using a single benefits index, constructed 
                                                 
7 Since a layoff can result from individual-specific poor performance and therefore affects wage in the new job, we also performed the 
estimations dropping that category in the definition of involuntary job changes. The results did not change in terms of the magnitude of the 




as the sum of the benefit indicators for retirement plans, paid vacation, and paid sick leave.  
While the index measure is less informative of the specific effects of each benefit, it allows us 
to implement and interpret more easily wage specifications that estimate different returns by 
benefit sectors and include a large number of  interaction variables. 
 
From this first set of results estimated using our primary sample of workers, we find positive 
wage differentials  associated with both  measures  of  health insurance, as  well as  retirement 
plans, paid vacation, and paid sick leave.  In the first column, the estimated coefficient on the 
EHI Held indicator suggests an estimated 20.5% average wage differential, after controlling for 
worker, firm and job characteristics. Individuals working in firms that offer health insurance but 
who do not hold it (EHI Offered), appear also to enjoy a 2.6% wage premium. Once we control 
for  the  availability  of  other  fringe  benefits,  we  observe  a  notable  decline  to  11.4%  in  the 
estimated wage differential for holding health insurance  and no  wage differential among those 
who are offered but do not hold coverage (second column of table 1). This finding suggests that 
previously  estimated  wage  differentials  associated  with  health  insurance  are  likely  to  have 
picked up the effect of other forms of compensation omitted in previous studies. The estimated 
wage premia associated with the other benefits are all positive and statistically significant, with 
the largest corresponding to holding a retirement plan (14.3%). When we use a benefits index 
(which captures an average benefits effect), we find the estimated wage differential to be equal 
to 7.9% (column 3 of table 1).  As mentioned above, these estimates likely reflect an omitted 
ability bias, whereby high-wage workers who have greater ability or other individual-specific 
unobservable traits, are more likely to select jobs that offer them non-wage compensation.  
 
If we assume that individual-specific traits are time-invariant and identically rewarded across 
benefit sectors (no worker selection due to comparative advantage), fixed-effect estimations can 
correct for such bias. Our fixed-effects model estimates are shown in column 4.  Here we see 
that  the  positive  wage  differential  associated  with  EHI  held  now  disappears  and  the    EHI 
offered  differential    is    now  negative,  although    quite  small  (-1.8%).
8  The benefit wage 
differential has also declined to a wage premium of 4.2%. These results suggest that full -time 
workers who hold jobs with non -wage compensation, including  a retirement plan, paid sick 
leave, and/or paid vacation, are paid significantly more than workers in jobs with none of these 
benefits.  While these results illustrate the importance of indivi dual-specific heterogeneity on 
the wage-benefits tradeoff, it is still possible that these estimated wage effects may be capturing 
selection effects if a worker’s skills, health status, and unobserved ability are not identically 
productive across all benefit sectors, or if workers have a comparative advantage in a given 
benefit sector based on his or her level of skills, health and individual traits.   
 
In  the  next  section,  we  investigate  the  role  and  importance  of  skills  and  health  status  in 
determining  worker  selection  and  mobility  across  benefit  sectors.  Then,  in  section  V,  we 
introduce an empirical method to evaluate worker selection effects on wages and test for the 
existence of compensating wage differentials after controlling for these selection effects.   
 
IV. Determinants of Worker Selection and Mobility into Benefit Sectors  
                                                 
8 In further investigations of this wage penalty associated with being offered but not holding health insurance, we ran fixed-effect estimations 
separately for male and female. While for male the wage penalty is mainly driven by being offered but not holding health insurance, for female 
the estimated wage penalty associated with being offered health insurance is similar whether she holds it or not. The result including male and 





We analyze possible determinants of worker selection and mobility across benefit sectors as a 
function of various worker characteristics, controlling for job and firm characteristics.
9 The 
empirical  framework  is  based  on  discrete  choice  models  in  which  the  latent  variable 
(unobserved by the econometrician) reflects the net benefits associated with two outcomes:  (1) 
holding a job with a given set of benefits to analyze the determinants of worker selection into 
benefit sectors and (2) switching to a job with a given set of benefits to analyze the determinants 
of  mobility  across  benefit  sectors.  We  define  the  following  four  benefit  sectors:  no  health 
insurance offered and no other benefits, no health insurance offered but other benefits offered 
(at least one of the three), health insurance offered (or held) but no other benefits, and health 
insurance offered (or held) and other benefits. 
 
In examining the determinants of worker selection into particular benefit sectors, we assume 
that utility increases with the number of benefits offered. We define a discrete variable as a 
count variable Bi with 3 outcomes: =0 for no health insurance offered and no other benefits, =1 
for either one of the two combinations: no health insurance offered but other benefits (at least 
one of the three), or health insurance offered (or held) but no other benefits, =2 for health 
insurance offered (or held) and other benefits. We estimate an ordered logit for the likelihood of 
holding a job with more benefits, where the base category is the value 0 for no health insurance 
and no other benefits.   The first column of Table 2 describes the results of this analysis. We 
find  that  education,  age,  the  worker’s  current  wage  level,  and  his  or  her  health  status  all 
statistically significantly increase the likelihood of holding a job with more benefits. Whether 
the worker is female and the presence of children also have a statistically significant positive 
impact on holding a job with more benefits. Whether the worker is unionized as well as the size 
of the firm in which the worker is employed both have a statistically significant positive impact 
on holding a job with more benefits as well. 
 
In the analysis of the determinants of worker mobility across benefit sectors, we exploit the 
dynamic nature of our data and use the sample of job changers to estimate the probability of 
switching to  a new job that offers more benefits  than the previous one P(Bit >  Bit-1), as  a 
function of worker, job and firm characteristics evaluated prior to the job change, at round t-1. 
We  find  that  the  level  of  wage  in  the  previous  job  significantly  reduces  the  likelihood  of 
changing to a job with more benefits, consistent with the presence of a tradeoff between wage 
and non-wage benefits. We also find that age significantly reduces the likelihood of changing to 
a job with more benefits (column 2, Table 2). The lack of significance of the other variables and 
the overall weaker results of this analysis among job changers may be due to  the different 
valuation and tax treatment of health insurance versus other benefits. We suspect that mobility 
and  selection  may  be  driven  mainly  by  the  presence  or  not  of  a  job  that  includes  health 
insurance. In fact, a simple look at the data shows that the frequency of job changes to a job 
where  health  insurance  is  held  is  11.4%  of  the  observations  while  it  is  only  1.9%  for  job 
changes to a job with more benefits (other than health insurance) as most jobs have at least a 
retirement plan, or sick leave, or paid vacation policies.  
 
In columns 3 and 4, we estimate an alternative specification, focusing only on the probability 
that an individual switches to a job that offers health insurance (regardless of whether it is held). 
                                                 




More  precisely,  it  is  the  conditional  probability  of  switching  to  a  job  that  offers  health 
insurance, conditional on currently holding a job without health insurance. We are particularly 
interested in human capital and health status variables as determinants of a worker switching to 
a job with health insurance. The hypothesis of positive worker selection into jobs with benefits 
put forth in previous studies of the wage-benefits relationship suggests that education and age 
(proxies for experience) should significantly increase the likelihood of switching to a job with 
benefits. The wage in the previous job may be an indicator of the worker’s productive abilities 
other than education and experience. Positive selection would imply a positive effect of the 
wage in the previous job on the likelihood of switching to a job with benefits. In other words, 
high wage workers are more likely to select into jobs with benefits. On the other hand, an 
explanation based on job matching offers the opposite prediction: if the wage reflects job match 
quality then only poor matches are likely to change jobs, then a negative relationship between 
the wage in the previous job and the likelihood to switch to a job with benefits would be 
expected. In other words, moving to a new job would be mainly driven by the opportunity to 
improve wages.  
 
Health status may affect the likelihood of switching to a job with benefits and health insurance 
in particular. Individuals with poorer health status may decide to switch to a job with health 
insurance. Similarly, an individual who experiences a deterioration in health status between two 
periods may decide to join a firm in order to have access to an offer of health insurance.
10 
Therefore, we estimate the effect of the worker’s health status prior to the period of the decision 
to change jobs as well as the effect of a deterioration in the worker’s health status prior to the 
job change.  The latter is measured as an indicator variable for whether the change in health 
status between rounds t-2 and t-1 is negative (e.g., good to fair or fair to poor).  Results from 
this model (columns 3 and 4) show that wage in the previous job, education, age, female and 
firm size in the previous job significantly increase the likelihood of switching to a job with 
health insurance. Interestingly, an individual’s level of health status prior to the job change 
decision actually reduces the likelihood of experiencing a job change from a job without health 
insurance to a job with health insurance, suggesting that healthier workers would be less likely 
to seek jobs with health insurance. Column 4 reports the specification in which we include a 
dummy to indicate the presence of a deterioration in health status prior to the decision to change 
jobs.  Here, the effect on the likelihood of switching to a job with health insurance is strongly 
positive. The effects of the other variables are similar to those in column 3.  
 
The last column re-estimates the specification in column 4 with random effects in order to take 
into  account  unobserved  individual-specific  traits  such  as  individuals’  valuation  of  health 
insurance benefits. Interestingly, the effects of the variables including previous period health 
deterioration  and  wage  in  the  previous  job  become  stronger,  suggesting  that  the  previous 
estimates suffered from a negative bias. Assuming individuals with stronger tastes for health 
insurance  are  more  likely  to  switch  to  a  job  with  health  insurance,  the  bias  suggests  that 
unobserved  preferences  for  health  insurance  are  negatively  correlated  with  heath  status 
deterioration (it is higher for individuals with health deterioration) and with the wage in the 
previous job (it is lower for high-wage individuals). 
                                                 
10 Bhattacharya and Vogt (2007) offer a model of sorting with this particular prediction and Kapur, Escarce, Marquis and Simon (2008) show 
evidence of the effect of worker health (measured as expected health costs) on employment distortions in small and large firms that offer health 





In summary, the analysis in Table 2 shows strong evidence of worker sorting based on skills, 
health status and unobserved ability or preferences for benefits. In addition, the results suggest 
that there is evidence of positive selection into jobs with more benefits with respect to skills, but 
that selection can be positive or negative in terms of health status. Healthier workers are more 
likely to hold a job with more benefits and they are less likely to switch to a job with more 
benefits. This effect is strong and significant for those switching to a job with health insurance. 
Furthermore, workers who experience a deterioration in health status between two periods are 
more  likely  to  switch  to  a  job  with  health  insurance  in  the  following  period,  suggesting 
additional evidence of negative selection into jobs with health insurance as it relates to health 
status. Based on the estimated coefficient, the log odds ratio equals 1.138 which implies that 
workers who experience a deterioration in health status between two periods are 13.8% more 
likely to switch to a job with health insurance in the following period. 
 
V. Worker Selection Effects on Wage Outcomes      
 
The issue of identification and estimation of the wage differentials between workers with an 
offer of health insurance and those without one involves addressing selection issues on the two 
sides of the market.  The equilibrium configuration of wages and insurance depends on both the 
profit-maximizing  decisions  of  firms  as  well  as  the  utility  maximizing  choices  of  workers 
(Jensen and Morrisey, 2001). The problem exists not only for the analysis of health insurance 
effects on wages but for the effects of other benefits too. An empirical analysis of the wage-
benefits relationship must take into account a two-sided selection mechanism: workers with a 
given level of skills and preferences select firms in which their skills are best valued since they 
have a comparative advantage in such firms, and firms, both those that provide benefits and 
those that don’t, must decide whether or not to hire workers with a given level of skills. In this 
section we investigate this idea by estimating a wage equation framework in which a worker’s 
productive characteristics, captured by his or her skills and health status, are interacted with 
benefit sector dummies in order to estimate and test for the presence of differential returns to 
skills and health status. We extend the basic Mincer wage equation by adding benefit-specific 
indicators  along  with  interactions  between  benefit-specific  dummies  and  human  capital 
variables. It is these interaction terms that reflect the differential returns. 
 
In the simple case of no comparative advantage based on unobserved-specific traits, the wage 
equations by benefit sectors are defined as:
11  
 
                    wNBit = αNB + βNBSKit + NBHit + Xit  + θi + it              (1a) 
                    wBit   = αB   + βBSKit    + BHit   + Xit  +  θi + it    (2a) 
 
where SKit summarizes measured worker characteristics including education, age, sex and race 
and Hit is a measure of self-reported health status, all of which may be differently productive 
across  sectors  that  provide  benefits  and  those  that  do  not,  Xit  includes  control  variables 
regarding the worker’s occupation and industry (both one-digit classifications), the size of the 
establishment in which the individual works, whether the firm has multiple locations, whether 
                                                 
11 The complete model with comparative advantage and selection based on skills, health and unobserved individual traits is presented in 




the worker resides in an MSA, whether the worker is unionized, and year and round dummies. 
These controls are assumed to have identical effects across sectors. θi is unobserved individual-
specific traits assumed here to be time invariant and identically productive in the benefit and 
non benefit sector. 
 
Evidence of differential returns to a worker’s productive characteristics across benefit sectors 
would  imply  that  workers  of  a  given  level  of  skills  and  health  status  have  a  comparative 
advantage  in  a  given  benefit  sector.
12  It may also capture the effect of selection based on 
unobserved (and unmeasured by the econometrician) individual-specific traits which are likely 
to be correlated with skills and health status. To address this issue, we use a more general wage 
specification in which in addition to skills and health status, we allow unobserved individual -
specific traits to not be equally productive across benefit sectors.  Moreover, the model allows 
workers to select jobs based on a comparative advantage with respect to individual -specific 
traits in addition to skills and health status. This extended wage equation model, which borrows 
from the endogenous sector choice model developed in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent 
(2005) and the GMM estimation technique, is necessary to implement empirically the model are 
described in appendices B and C respectively.
13 
 
The model provides specific predictions about the sources of worker mobility across benefit 
sectors. Workers switch to a job with benefits as a result of a change in beliefs about the value 
of their individual trait and how well it is rewarded in the current sector as compared to other 
sectors. This means that unobserved ability and/or tastes for benefits, as well as an increase in 
these unobserved individual characteristics, should help to predict future switches to a job that 
includes benefits as part of total compensation. An illustration of the non-random allocation of 
workers across benefit sectors based on individual trait θi is presented in Figure 1.  
 
For selection outcomes related to measured skills and health status, the model’s predictions in 
terms of worker selection depend on their respective correlation with unobserved individual-
specific traits which further depend on the interpretation of θi (talent or tastes for benefits). The 
nature  of  the  resulting  selection  outcomes  for  these  two  variables  (positive  or  negative 
selection) is therefore an empirical question. We discuss below different possible outcomes.  
 
If θi represents an individual’s talent or ability, it is likely to be positively correlated with skills. 
In this case, the selection outcome for skills (illustrated in the bottom part of Figure 1) is such 
that a skilled worker would be more likely to be observed in a job that provides benefits as well 
as to switch to a job with benefits following a change in expected θi. Similarly for health status, 
one can imagine a positive correlation with θi if it represents ability. A healthier worker would 
be more likely to end up in a job with benefits and the returns to health status would be greater 
in  those  benefit  sectors  that  include  health  insurance,  relative  to  the  non-benefit  sectors. 
Therefore if θi represents ability, the model suggests positive selection with respect to θi and 
both health status and skills.   
                                                 
12 In a perfectly competitive labor market the returns to skills and health equalize as workers freely move between benefit sectors and no 
differential returns should be observed at equilibrium. However the literature on benefits and especially health insurance report evidence of 
costly mobility and job lock (Madrian 1994). Furthermore, even assuming costless mobility, differential returns to skills and health may arise if 
selection based on unobserved individual-specific traits is not taken into account. We further investigate this last point when using the complete 
selection model.   





If θi represents tastes for benefits, the correlation with skills may be positive but not necessarily, 
as a less skilled worker may value benefits more because of the financial protection that it 
provides.  It  is  also  possible  that  health  status  is  negatively  correlated  with  θi  if  tastes  for 
benefits, in particular health insurance, increase as a worker’s health status declines.  In this 
case, it is possible to observe positive selection based on θi but negative worker selection based 
on health status.  Since health insurance is one of the benefits offered whose main purpose is to 
provide financial protections against costs associated with negative health shocks, one may well 
observe that a decrease in health status leads to a switch to a job with health insurance. In fact, 
the analysis reported in Table 2 confirms this prediction. In the case of negative selection, the 
returns to health status are expected to be negative or decreasing in health. Going back to Figure 
1, while a worker with a higher θi  will optimally select sector J (positive returns to θi), if the 
slope for sector J is negative (negative returns to health)  and the slope for sector K is less 
negative or positive, unhealthy  workers will optimally select sector  J while healthy worker 
select sector K.    
 
The first  two columns of Table 3 reiterate the OLS and fixed-effect  model estimates  from 
equations (1a) and (2a) above in which comparative advantage and selection are based only on 
skills and health status. Column 3 presents the GMM estimation results of the full selection 
model which includes comparative advantage based on unobserved traits as well.
14 Column 4 
presents the GMM estimation results for the sample of involuntary job changers.    
  
Starting with the first half of the table which  presents the estimates of the returns to skills by 
benefit sectors, one can see that the OLS estimates (first column) are all positive and significant. 
More importantly for the selection argument, the returns to skills are not identical across benefit 
sectors. In particular, firms that offer both health insurance and other benefits (pension and/or 
paid vacation and/or sick leave) are associated with the largest returns to skills.  Going back to 
the two-sided selection model defined earlier, this means that o n the one hand, firms that 
provide the complete benefit package are also firms that reward skills more (relative to firms 
that do not offer the full set of benefits) and that workers that select these firms are workers that 
have greater skills than workers that select firms that do not offer the full set of benefits.  The 
value of the statistic for the test of equality of returns across benefit sectors is large and the null 
of equality is clearly rejected. However, the OLS estimates are likely to be contamin ated by an 
ability bias. The fixed -effect estimates which control for unobserved ability or tastes for 
benefits (column 2), show returns that are slightly different. Although the result of the test also 
rejects the null of equality of returns across benefit sectors, the sector with the largest returns to 
skills is now the one in which firms offer other benefits but not health insurance. This suggests 
that the OLS estimates of the returns to skills in firms offering the full set of benefits, including 
health insurance, were contaminated by an ability bias.  That part of the returns to skills result 
reflected, for example, either greater ability or a greater preference for health insurance. 
 
The GMM estimates of the returns to skills (column 3) are much smalle r than the fixed-effect 
estimates. Taking into account non-random selection based on unobserved individual -specific 
traits allows one to fully control for the correlation of such unobserved traits with the choice 
and mobility of workers across benefits sectors. The test of equality of returns cannot reject the 
                                                 




null at the 5% level. This suggests that the OLS and fixed-effect estimates of the returns to 
skills  by  benefit  sector  reflected  the  correlation  between  individual  traits  and  skills.  Note, 
however, that the returns to skills in firms that offer health insurance and other benefits are still 
positive and statistically significant suggesting that in these firms’ workers have greater skills 
than in the other sectors. For the sample of involuntary job changers (column 4), the estimates 
of the returns to skills are largest in firms that offer other benefits without health insurance and 
those that  provide the combination of health insurance and other fringe benefits. Statistical 
testing clearly rejects the null of equality of returns across benefit sectors. Overall, one can 
conclude  that  for  the  whole  sample  of  workers,  there  is  some  (weak)  evidence  of  worker 
selection based on skills in firms that offer health insurance and other benefits. The evidence is 
stronger (especially in firms that offer other benefits not including health insurance) among 
involuntary job changers.  
 
The second half of Table 3 shows the results for the returns to health status. The OLS estimates 
show statistically significant positive returns to health status, suggesting positive selection with 
respect to health status.  However, the fixed-effect and GMM estimates suggest that sectors 
where firms offer no benefits and those where only health insurance is offered (but no other 
benefits) are associated with negative selection. This  suggests  that workers in these sectors 
tend  to  have  poorer  health  status  than  workers  in  sectors  that  offer  other  benefits 
(complemented or not with health insurance).  
 
The  next  half  of  Table  3  shows  the  estimates  of  the  intercepts  or  compensating  wage 
differentials. The OLS and fixed-effects estimates show evidence of positive wage differentials 
(relative to offering no benefits) in firms that offer other benefits (complemented or not with 
health insurance).  Moreover, they show negative wage differentials for firms that offer only 
health insurance.  The GMM estimates are drastically reduced and not statistically significant in 
all the sectors. For the sample of job changers, positive and large wage differentials are found in 
firms  that offer other benefits  (complemented  or not  with  health insurance). This  result, in 
conjunction with the greater returns to skills in these same firms and the positive selection in 
terms of health status noticed previously, suggests that our sample of involuntary job changers 
may not be a representative sample of workers experiencing a random exogenous job shock. In 
fact, by construction, the individuals selected must have left their job and be in a new job 
between  two  consecutive  rounds  which  means  within  approximately  six  months,  given  the 
survey design. This sample contains job changers that were able to very quickly find a new job 
and therefore experience “easier” mobility. Overall, our sample of involuntary job changers is 
likely to be more skilled than the broader population of involuntary job changers. 
 
The bottom half of Table 3 displays the GMM estimates of the returns to individual-specific 
traits by benefit sectors. For the full sample of workers, there is evidence of positive selection 
based on these traits in all the benefit sectors (relative to the non benefit sector). The returns are 
all significantly different from one (the normalized return in the no benefit sector). Note that the 
returns are larger in the sector that offers health insurance and no other benefits. This result is 
further confirmed over the sample of involuntary job changers. In this case, the only sector 
which has returns to individual-specific traits significantly greater than one (and large as well) 
is the sector in which firms offer health insurance but no other benefits. This result is consistent 




among job changers, it shows that firms that offer health insurance and no other benefits attract 
workers with greater tastes for health insurance. Following this last result, another explanation 
for the rapid movement to a new job (in addition to greater skills or ability) may be a change 
(deterioration) in health status. This may explain the strong negative selection effects based on 
health previously found for this sample of workers.   
 
In terms of the quality of the GMM estimations, the overidentification tests always reject the 
null that the instruments used are not valid.
15 We also ran separate F tests for analyzing the 
predictive power of the instruments and the results (shown in appendix C T able 2) show that 
our instruments are good predictors of lagged wages and current period benefits dummies.  
 
Overall, the results related to the selection effects on wage outcomes for the whole sample of 
workers suggest that there is strong evidence of worker selection based on individual -specific 
traits (taste for benefits or ability). Workers with greater levels of such traits have a comparative 
advantage in working in a firm that offers benefits compared to firms that  offer no benefits. 
Moreover, after taking this  non-random selection  mechanism into account,  the results show 
evidence of worker selection based on skills and health  status  into  firms that offer health 
insurance complemented with other benefits. On the oth er hand, for the whole sample of 
workers, once selection based on skills, health  status and unobserved individual traits is taken 
into account, we find no such evidence of compensating wage differentials.  
 
The analysis based on the sample of involuntary  job changers shows stronger effects for this 
particular group of workers in terms of the returns to skills and health and  there is evidence of 
positive  compensating  wage  differentials   in  firms  that  offer  other  benefits  (with  health 
insurance complemented or not).
16 The results suggest that  job changers with  higher skills, 
better  health status, and  lower preference for benefits are observed in firms with either no 
benefits or with  a comprehensive set of   benefits, while those with lower-skill, lower health 
status, and a strong taste for health insurance are observed in firms that offer health insurance 
but no other benefits.   Workers with health  issues  and  an increased  preference  for health 
insurance may be willing to join firms that offer health insurance  only, at the cost of receiving 
no other benefits. This result is consistent with the idea of workers’ (and firms’) reallocation of 
compensation  choice  between  health  insurance  and  other  benefits  possibly  in  response  to 
increasing health insurance premiums (Goldman, Sood and Leibowitz, 2005). 
 
Our analysis and results are subject to limitations. First, employers may require workers to pay 
an out-of-pocket premium in order to hold health insurance.  Unfortunately, this information is 
not available for all of the years of the data and as a result, this omitted information may impact 
our estimates of the compensating wage differentials (Pauly, 2001).  Second, we acknowledge 
that our measures of non-wage compensation are coarse.  Optimally, we would like to know the 
value associated with each of the benefits provided, but again the MEPS does not contain this 
information.  To the extent that the value of benefits varies within and across sectors, or along 
other firm dimensions (e.g., size), this may affect our ability to precisely estimate the wage-
                                                 
15 Hansen test based on the minimized value of the objective function that characterizes the moment conditions. The distribution of the statistic 
follows a χ
2 with l-k degrees of freedom where l is the number of instruments and k is the number of parameters (Hansen 1982). 
16 We ran additional GMM estimations further dividing the main sample of workers by gender and age. We find that for male workers below 
age 30, the results are very similar to those found for the sample of involuntary job changers.  Simple tabulations confirm that our sample of 




benefit relationship.  Finally, the present empirical framework does not address the issue of 
firm-specific heterogeneity and the idea that “good” firms (good in unobservable dimensions) 
may be more likely to offer benefits. As the results seem to suggest, there is still a significant 
wage premium associated with being offered benefits including health insurance. Firms may 
face different health insurance markets (Dafny, 2008) or may be subject to different kinds of tax 
incentives, depending on the state in which they are located (Stabile, 2002).  Both of these 
factors may influence their likelihood of offering benefits and health insurance. In sum, the 
positive  wage  premium  may  be  explained  by  location  advantages,  and  unobserved  or 





In this paper, we revisit the question of the existence of a trade-off between wages and health 
insurance  by  extending  previous  work  in  the  following  way:  1)  we  use  an  econometric 
framework and GMM estimation method which allows us to address the issues of endogenous 
choice of benefits and endogenous mobility into benefit sectors encountered in the literature and 
estimate the extent of worker selection based on unobserved individual traits, skills and health 
status,  2)  we  extend  the  analysis  of  the  wage-health  insurance  relationship  by  taking  into 
account possible combinations of health insurance with other fringe benefits (retirement, sick 
leave and paid vacation) and by including information on workers’ self-reported health status, 
and 3) we also analyze whether there are differential wage effects for holding health insurance 
versus being offered at the firm but not holding it. 
 
Based  on  the  first  part  of  our  analysis,  we  find  no  significant  wage  effect  associated  with 
holding health insurance and  a small negative  effect  (often not  significant)  associated  with 
being offered health insurance but not holding it. We therefore conclude that the results do not 
suggest any evidence of a group incidence effect being important. Additionally, we find clear 
differences  in  the  relationship  between  wages  and  benefits  depending  on  the  type  and/or 
combination  of  benefits  being  offered  as  part  of  compensation.    In  particular,  selection 
outcomes and their effect on wages differ by whether other benefits are combined or not with 
health insurance. This implies that health insurance compensating wage differentials (or any 
compensating differentials associated with a single benefit) estimated in the literature absent 
any controls for the presence of other benefits are biased.  
 
Regarding worker selection, there is strong evidence that skills and health status drive workers’ 
choice of benefit sector and mobility into jobs with health insurance, even after controlling for 
individual-specific  unobserved  heterogeneity.  In  particular,  a  deterioration  in  health  status 
increases significantly the likelihood of seeking a job that offers health insurance. Workers who 
experience a deterioration in health status between two periods are 13.8% more likely to switch 
to a job with health insurance in the following period. 
 
For the effect of worker selection on wages, across the whole sample of workers, we find strong 
evidence of non random selection based on individual-specific traits into the benefit sectors 




of selection based on skills and health status. However, we find no evidence of compensating 
wage differentials, even after taking into account of these different sources of worker selection.  
 
For the sample of involuntary job  changers, the results suggest a particular match between 
workers and jobs. More highly skilled workers, those in better health, and workers with higher 
individual-specific  traits  are  more  likely  to  select  jobs  with  either  no  benefits  or  the 
comprehensive set of benefits (health insurance and other benefits).  They are also more likely 
to receive a positive wage premium.  We also find that workers with lower health status and 
stronger tastes for benefits (presumably health insurance) are more likely to choose jobs with 
health  insurance  only,  at  the  cost  of  receiving  no  other  benefits  and  no  significant  wage 
premium. 
 
The results regarding the presence of compensating wage differentials associated with benefits 
reveal no significant premium for the primary sample of workers. For the sample of involuntary 
job changers, we find a significantly positive wage premium in jobs where workers receive 
other benefits, whether complemented or not by health insurance. In contrast, we find no similar 
positive  wage  premium  in  jobs  that  offer  only  health  insurance.  Overall  these  results  are 
inconsistent with the theory of a wage-benefit trade off. Given the previous selection outcomes 
found for the sample of involuntary job changers, firms that offer other benefits  (including 
health insurance) seem to be able to pay higher wages by attracting higher skilled and healthier 
workers. Based on our findings, one could speculate that if a tradeoff does exist, then it may be 
occurring through the allocation of other non-wage benefits (e.g., retirement plan, paid vacation, 
paid sick leave) rather than through the decision to offer/accept lower wages. For example some 
workers with strong preference for health insurance would be willing to trade-off other benefits 
for health insurance.        
 
Based on these results, future work might be to more precisely quantify and decompose the 
wage  gap  into  the  parts  that  are  due  to  firm-specific  policies  (the  intercepts  reflecting  the 
positive wage premiums) and those due to worker selection based on individual traits, skills and 
health status. Obtaining more specific information about regional variations in health insurance 
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Figure 1 : Non random Selection of Workers 






















Figure 2 : Non random Selection of Workers 
across Sectors Based on Observable S 
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Table 1. Wage Differentials by Employer-Provided 
Health Insurance and Other Benefits
1 
 












Health Insurance         
         
   EHI Held  0.205***  0.114***  0.102***  0.000 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.004) 
   EHI Offered  0.026**  -0.002  -0.017  -0.018*** 
  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.005) 
Other Benefits         
    Retirement    0.143***     
    (0.006)     
   Sick Pay    0.072***     
    (0.008)     
    Paid vacation    0.013     
    (0.010)     
Other Benefits Index      0.079***  0.042*** 
      (0.003)  (0.002) 
R2  0.47  0.48  0.48  0.11 
N (observations)  30098  30098  30098  30098 
Notes:  
1- Sample of workers not married. The estimations also includes education, 
quadratic functions of age and job tenure,  number of kids, the log of firm size, a 
dummy indicating whether the establishment has multiple locations, whether the 
worker is unionized, dummies for female, nonwhite, metropolitan area, 4 region 
dummies, 5 one digit occupation dummies, 7 one digit industry dummies and year 
and round dummies.  
2- Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Asterisks denote: ***Statistically 
significant at α = 0.01, ** at α = 0.05, * at α = 0.10. 
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        (0.206)  (0.289) 
Health  0.061***  -0.049  -0.163*  -0.227**  -0.186 
  (0.021)  (0.110)  (0.096)  (0.100)  (0.154) 
Wage   0.099***  -0.090***  0.043**  0.042**  0.089*** 
  (0.008)  (0.032)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.024) 
Education   0.083***  0.021  0.069*  0.060  0.152** 
  (0.009)  (0.049)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.067) 
Age   0.022***  -0.015*  0.008  0.008  0.017 
  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.013) 
Non White Dummy   -0.035  -0.164  -0.262  -0.243  -0.446 
  (0.049)  (0.254)  (0.190)  (0.192)  (0.330) 
Female Dummy  0.330***  0.112  0.336*  0.373**  0.659** 
  (0.047)  (0.230)  (0.186)  (0.188)  (0.317) 
Kids Dummy  0.081*  0.220  -0.097  -0.092  -0.264 
  (0.043)  (0.208)  (0.180)  (0.181)  (0.300) 
Union Dummy  1.068***  -0.542  0.233  0.229  0.761 
  (0.101)  (0.609)  (0.552)  (0.560)  (0.815) 
Firm Size (/100)  0.277***  -0.049  0.206***  0.203***  0.357*** 
  (0.017)  (0.079)  (0.058)  (0.058)  (0.100) 
City Dummy   -0.071  -0.319  0.229  0.228  0.496 
  (0.050)  (0.251)  (0.193)  (0.291)  (0.378) 
Log Likelihood  -13566.3  -489.18  -730.1  -676.9  -676.1 
Observations  30098  4311  1453  1453  1453 
Notes: 
1- Sample of workers not married.  Robust standard errors in parenthesis *** for statistically significant at α = 0.01, ** at α = 0.05, * at α = 0.10. 
2-The estimations also includes a dummy indicating whether the establishment has multiple locations, 4 region dummies, 5 one digit occupation 
dummies, 7 one digit industry dummies, and year and round dummies.  















   











Estimated Returns to the Skill Index 
       
Not Offered/Held      No Other Benefits  1.403***  1.935***  0.927*  0.314 
  (0.122)  (0.252)  (0.539)  (0.739) 
Not Offered/Held      Other Benefits  1.408***  2.218***  0.317  1.260** 
  (0.160)  (0.250)  (0.252)  (0.548) 
Offered/Held             No Other Benefits  1.562***  1.722***  0.699  -0.337 
  (0.168)  (0.258)  (0.770)  (0.867) 
Offered/Held             Other Benefits  2.263***  1.950***  0.374**  1.575*** 
  (0.047)  (0.245)  (0.175)  (0.611) 
Test of Equality of Returns  25.63  9.68  6.76  12.09 
(p-value)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.080)  (0.007) 
 
Estimated Returns to the Health Index 
       
Not Offered/Held      No Other Benefits  0.079**  -0.020**  -0.018  -0.000 
  (0.037)  (0.009)  (0.020)  (0.045) 
Not Offered/Held      Other Benefits  0.061  0.027**  0.010  0.031 
  (0.050)  (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.033) 
Offered/Held             No Other Benefits  0.186***  -0.004  -0.004  -0.208** 
  (0.052)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.089) 
Offered/Held             Other Benefits  0.106***  0.004  0.005*  0.021* 
  (0.012)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.014) 
Test of Equality of Returns  1.21  3.70  3.38  7.89 
(p-value)  (0.304)  (0.011)  (0.336)  (0.04) 
R2  0.47  0.11  -  - 
Observations  30098  30098  22309  885 
Notes: 
1-Sample of workers not married. Also includes the log of firm size, a dummy indicating whether the establishment has multiple locations 
and for metropolitan area, 4 region dummies, 5 one digit occupation dummies, 7 one digit industry dummies, and year and round 
dummies.  
***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10, 



















2         
Not Offered/Held      Other Benefits  0.075***  0.093***  0.066  0.120*** 
  (0.020)  (0.008)  (0.051)  (0.040) 
Offered/Held             No Other Benefits  0.032  -0.019***  0.027  -0.062 
  (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.036)  (0.044) 
Offered/Held             Other Benefits  0.279***  0.080***  0.051  0.132*** 
  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.051)  (0.038) 
         
Estimated Returns to Unobserved Individual Traits
2         
Not Offered/Held      No Other Benefits      1  1 
         
Not Offered/Held      Other Benefits      1.024***
  0.976*** 
      (0.010)  (0.027) 
Offered/Held             No Other Benefits      1.034***
  1.056***
 
      (0.017)  (0.037) 
Offered/Held             Other Benefits      1.008***
  1.004*** 
      (0.004)  (0.013) 
Test of Equality of Returns 
(All Returns =1) 




(p-value)      (0.002)  (0.339) 
         
Overidentification Test  -  -  75.09  39.40 
      (0.215)  (0.999) 
R2  0.47  0.11  -  - 
Observations  30098  30098    885 
Notes: 
1-Sample of workers not married. Also includes the log of firm size, a dummy indicating whether the establishment has multiple locations 
and for metropolitan area, 4 region dummies, 5 one digit occupation dummies, 7 one digit industry dummies, and year and round dummies.  
***=p<.01, **=p<.05, *=p<.10, 
+=returns to өi significantly different from 1 at the 5% level. 


































Health Insurance (=1;0)                 
EHI Held   0.803  0.002  1  0  0  0  0  0 
EHI Offered (not held)  0.058  0.001  0  0  1  0  0  0 
Other Benefits (=1;0)                 
Retirement Plans  0.622  0.003  0.738  0.003  0.295  0.010  0.089  0.004 
Sick Pay  0.714  0.003  0.822  0.003  0.436  0.011  0.207  0.006 
Paid Vacation  0.833  0.002  0.927  0.002  0.690  0.010  0.352  0.006 
Job/Firm Characteristics                 
Log Wage  2.689  0.003  2.787  0.003  2.368  0.011  2.254  0.007 
Job Tenure (# years)  6.538  0.043  7.435  0.052  3.271  0.101  2.721  0.064 
Unionized  0.140  0.002  0.168  0.002  0.047  0.004  0.020  0.002 
Number of Employees at 













Single Location Establishments  0.293  0.003  0.238  0.003  0.299  0.010  0.608  0.007 
Large Firm (> 499)  0.213  0.002  0.248  0.003  0.123  0.007  0.048  0.003 
Occupation (=1;0)                 
   Professional and Technical  0.259  0.002  0.295  0.003  0.163  0.008  0.090  0.004 
   Managerial and Administrative  0.078  0.001  0.088  0.002  0.045  0.005  0.034  0.003 
   Sales  0.111  0.002  0.104  0.002  0.134  0.007  0.138  0.005 
   Clerical  0.175  0.002  0.190  0.003  0.146  0.007  0.102  0.004 
   Craftsman, Operatives, 













   Service Workers  0.127  0.002  0.095  0.002  0.234  0.009  0.266  0.006 
Location Characteristics (=1;0)                 
MSA    0.868  0.002  0.872  0.002  0.866  0.007  0.846  0.005 
Region1   0.189  0.002  0.201  0.003  0.137  0.007  0.142  0.005 
Region2  0.235  0.002  0.245  0.003  0.204  0.009  0.191  0.005 
Region3  0.356  0.003  0.339  0.003  0.427  0.010  0.422  0.007 
Region4  0.220  0.002  0.215  0.003  0.233  0.009  0.245  0.006 
Person Characteristics                 
Education (# years)  13.39  0.014  13.73  0.015  12.44  0.052  11.81  0.037 
Age  38.29  0.062  39.18  0.073  35.83  0.244  34.22  0.149 
Non White  0.200  0.002  0.200  0.003  0.217  0.009  0.193  0.005 
Female  0.493  0.003  0.520  0.003  0.434  0.011  0.362  0.007 
Number of Kids  0.391  0.005  0.359  0.005  0.573  0.021  0.503  0.013 
Job Changes  0.249  0.002  0.191  0.003  0.425  0.010  0.514  0.007 
Notes: Sample of full-time workers not married. The sample has 30098 observations and 9403workers. 3202 
workers are job changers. 




Appendix B: Endogenous Sector Choice Model 
Selection Based on Comparative Advantage and Learning 
 
Framework of Analysis 
 
The  model  that  we  consider  is  based  on  the  idea  that  workers  have  a  comparative 
advantage, one that is  based on unobserved individual-specific traits  that drives their 
endogenous choice of benefits.  Thus, learning about these unobserved traits (e.g., ability 
and  tastes  for  benefits)  influences  the  mobility  of  workers  across  firms  that  provide 
benefits or not. 
 
The model is based on the following assumptions: i) individuals differ in productive 
abilities, some of which are measured skills (human capital and health status), and others 
of which are unobserved by the market and the econometrician (e.g,. innate ability, tastes 
for particular fringe benefits), and ii) workers’ measured and unobserved skills are not 
identically productive in all sectors.  In this particular application, we define firm sectors 
by their provision of non-wage benefits.  
 
This  second  assumption  also  can  be  viewed  as  implying  differences  in  firms’  total 
compensation decisions with respect to the particular mix of wages and benefits they 
provide. Firms that provide fringe benefits as part of total compensation may attach more 
or less importance to measured skills and unobservable individual-specific attributes as 
compared to those that do not provide benefits.  One potential reason for this may be that 
firms face different monitoring costs.
17  More generally, firms that offer benefits may 
have a wage policy function such that average wages (irrespective of worker skills) are 
lower than firms that do not provide benefits.  This may be done by firms in order to 
offset the costs of providing benefits.  However, at the same time, it is possible that these 
firms offer higher returns to skills as a way to attract skilled workers (for example by 
putting more weight on education and tenure than firms that do not offer benefits).  
 
The relationship between wages and employer-provided benefits is such that the cost of 
providing benefits can be offset either through lower wages (the wage -benefits tradeoff) 
or  through  attracting  more  productive  workers  (worker  selection  effects)  or  a 
combination of both. The comparative advantage assumption ii) above allows one to 
identify  and  estimate  the  effects  of  worker  selection  based  on  observable  and 
unobservable characteristics on wages.  This is accomplished by estimating and testing 
for differences in the returns to measured skills, health, and unobserved individual traits 
across  employers  that  provide  different  combinations  of  benefits.    The  model  can 
therefore be used to estimate the relative importance of worker selection effects in the 
wage-benefits relationship through these potential differential returns, as well as through 
the role of firms’ benefits provision on wages.  We measure the latter through intercept 
effects  of  indicators  for  benefits  on  the  level  of  wages,  independent  of  the  workers’ 
productive characteristics.   It is this last effect that captures the wage-benefits tradeoff. 
 
                                                 
17 Large firms that are also more likely to offer benefits pay for a greater number of supervisors to maintain 




More formally, assume wages equal expected productivity and that firms differ in their 
decisions regarding total compensation.  In particular, assume that firms differ in their 
policies  regarding  the  mix  of  wages  and  benefits  that  they  provide  for  workers’ 
compensation.    For  ease  of  exposition,  we  describe  a  two-sector  endogenous  choice 
model, whereby the workers are allocated to sectors based on whether the firm in which 
they are employed provides benefits or not.  In this case, the wage equations in each 
sector have a specific wage-benefits mix that can be written as follows: 
 
                    wNBit = αNB + βNBSKit + NBHit + Xit  + λNB θ
e
it + it               (1b) 
                    wBit   = αB   + βBSKit    + BHit   + Xit  +  λB θ
e
it + it      (2b) 
  
 
where SKit summarizes measured worker characteristics including education, age, sex and 
race and Hit is a measure of self-reported health status, all of which may be differently 
productive  across  sectors  providing  benefits  or  not,  Xit  includes  control  variables 
regarding the worker’s occupation and industry (both one-digit classifications), the size 
of  the  establishment  in  which  the  individual  works,  whether  the  firm  has  multiple 
locations, whether the worker resides in an MSA, whether the worker is unionized, and 
year and round dummies. These controls are assumed to have identical effects across 
sectors. 
 
The error term includes a random productivity shock (white noise) common to all sectors 
(it) and θ
e
it summarize beliefs about individual-specific traits like innate ability or tastes 
for benefits, which are not perfectly observed by the market and individual.  Firms build 
beliefs about it as they observe realizations of a worker’s productivity. Formally,  θ
e
it = 
E(θi| yit-1, .., yi0) where yit-1, .., yi0 are previous realizations of the worker’s productivity.  
 
The effect on wages of worker non-random selection into firms providing benefits or not, 
an effect based on SKit,Hit, and θ
e
it can be summarized in the following equation: 
 
WGit  = (αB - αNB ) +  (βB - βNB) SKit + (B - NB) Hit + (λB - λNB) θ
e
it               (3b) 
 
In this equation, WG represents the wage gap at a given point in time between benefit 
holders  and  non-holders.    The  part  of  the  gap  describing  selection  effects  based  on 
measured skills, health status and individual-specific unobservable traits are captured by 
differences in the  βs, s, and λs, while the part due to benefits’ wage differentials is given 
by the difference   αB - αNB.   If the difference is negative, (αB < αNB), this would be 
consistent with the wage-benefits tradeoff hypothesis. 
 
The parameters associated with the returns to skills, health, and unobservable traits can 
be identified by exploiting variations coming from individuals changing into or out of a 
firm with or without benefits.   The problem is that job changes are likely to be correlated 
with unobservable traits. The empirical model described above addresses this issue of 
endogenous worker mobility. 




The  model  uses  the  idea  that  mobility  is  generated  by  symmetric  learning  about  the 
individual-specific traits θi  by workers and employers whose information set is similar. 
Beliefs about these traits or expected traits, defined above as  θ
e
it = E(θi| yit-1, .., yi0), 
evolve over time according to a martingale process. This is the case because the market 
(workers  and  employers)  has  rational  expectations  so  that  the  best  prediction  about 
market beliefs about θi at t+1, θ
e
it+1, is current beliefs θ
e
it. A change in beliefs can only be 
the  result  of  a  random  shock  εit+1,  unpredictable  prior  to  time  t+1.  The  martingale 






it-1 + εit           (4) 
 
A positive change in beliefs reflects that a worker is higher in terms of individual-specific 
attributes and this leads him to decide to switch to a firm in which these attributes are 
more  productive,  or  similarly,  to  a  firm  with  benefits  which  better  rewards  these 
attributes.  In  addition  to  estimating  simultaneously  worker  selection  effects  and  the 
existence  of  a  wage-benefits  tradeoff,  the  model  can  be  used  to  test  the  relative 
importance of comparative advantage and learning effects on wages as factors affecting 
workers’ decisions to select into a job with or without benefits.  
 




Appendix C: Estimation and Choice of Instruments 
 
For the full sample of workers, the estimable form of the wage equation is given by: 
 
         (5) 
 
where Dijt is a dummy indicating whether benefits are provided or not and in the two 
sector model presented above, j=NB, B. In the analysis we perform, we define a four 
sector model by subcategorizing B based on different combinations of benefits (health 
insurance and/or other benefits). Given the finding in table 1 that there are no significant 
wage differential effects between being offered health insurance and not holding it and 
holding health insurance for the main sample of job changers, we grouped these two 
categories  into  a  single  one  characterizing  health  insurance  holding/offering.
18  Since 
retirement plans, paid sick leave and paid vacation are often provided together and to 
reduce the number of parameters to estimate given the large number of interaction terms, 
we utilize the benefit index defined above in our model specification.  More specifically, 
we define a dummy variable indicating whether the index is strictly positive suggesting 
that the worker holds at least one of the three possible benefits and equal to 0 if none of 
the three benefits are offered. In the end, we define four possible sector choices: 1) no 
health insurance held or offered and no other benefits, 2) no health insurance held  or 
offered and other benefits, 3) health insurance held or offered but no other benefits, 4) 
health insurance held or offered and other benefits. 
 








HI  Not 
Offered/ 
 Held  
HI  Offered/ 
Held 
HI  Not 
Offered/ 





No Other Benefits  Other Benefits 
 
 





84.91  7.93  2.75  4.41  100 
 
HI Offered/Held  5.23  87.55  3.11  4.11  100 
 





3.13  0.49  75.85  20.53  100 
 
HI Offered/Held  0.69  0.24  0.82  98.25  100 
Frequency of Obs.     8.47  4.24  5.47  81.82  100 
Notes: 
The numbers in each cell give the percentage of observations associated with transitions from a given category of benefits 
at t-1 Bt-1 to either the same category (the diagonal shaded cells) or a different category of benefits at t.  
                                                 
18 In other words, we define a health insurance dummy equal to 1 if workers respond that they hold health 
insurance or that it is offered at their firm (even though they do not hold it) and equal to 0 if it is not offered 
and not held. This definition of health insurance therefore combines measures from the worker side (held) 








To get an idea of the extent of worker mobility across sectors, Appendix C Table 1 above 
illustrates the frequency of worker transitions between two consecutive rounds in and out 
of the four fringe benefits sectors.  From this, one can see patterns capturing transitions 
between jobs that result in benefits changes, relative to transitions that result in the same 
benefits characterization or simply stable employment across rounds.  In the table, the 
diagonal cells show transitions associated with no change in benefits sector between two 
consecutive rounds. One can see that the most stable benefits situations is the one in 
which workers hold health insurance, whether it is combined with other benefits or not, 
with 98.25% and 87.55% of observation respectively. The less stable ones occur where 
the worker does not hold health insurance (84.91% of observations in the case without 
additional benefits and 75.85% in the case with additional benefits). The cells in the 
southwest corner of the diagonal indicate transitions to fewer benefits (than the diagonal 
situation) while the cells to the northeast corner illustrate transitions into jobs with more 
benefits. The frequencies of transitions tend to be higher for transitions to more benefits 
than  fewer  benefits.  The  last  row  of  the  table  gives  the  frequency  of  observations 
associated  with  each  benefit  option.  The  option  of  both  health  insurance  and  other 
benefits represents 81.82% of the observations. Of the remaining 20% of observation, a 
bit less than half of them corresponds to no fringe benefits, about a quarter of them 
represents the option of no health insurance but other benefits  and a quarter of them 
corresponds to health insurance and no other benefits.   
 
Given that we use four dummies to capture the presence of benefits and that we need to 
compute interactions with the worker’s skills, we apply a similar approach as Gibbons, 
Katz,  Lemieux  and  Parent  (2005)  and  Lluis  (2005)  for  summarizing  the  different 
measures of skills.  More specifically, we construct a skill index, defined as the predicted 
wage generated from a regression in which explanatory variables include current values 
of education, a quadratic in age, gender, and race dummies for the sample of all workers. 
This regression also includes occupation and industry dummies, dummies for whether the 
worker is unionized, lives in an MSA, the log of establishment size, year and  round 
dummies.  These  control  variables  are  added  for  consistency  with  previous  empirical 
findings  on  the  existence  of  wage  differentials  related  to  factors  other  than  skill 
differences  (potentially  as  a  result  of  the  existence  of  efficiency  wages,  rents  or 
compensating differentials related to undesirable job characteristics).  We normalize the 
skill index to have a mean of 0.  Note also that to treat health status in a similar way as 
the skill variable, we also normalized it to have a mean of 0 over the full sample of 
workers. 
 
From equation (5) above, fixed-effect estimations will not eliminate  θ
e
it because it is 




appropriate methodology in this case is to quasi-differentiate the wage equation.
19 The 




As a result of the quasi-differentiation, the log of wages in period t-1 appears on the right  
hand side of the wage equation which creates a problem of endogeneity. To address this,  
we instrument lagged wages. Although θ
e
it is now eliminated from the equation, there is a  
remaining  source  of  endogeneity  which  results  from  endogenous  worker  mobility:  a 
worker’s decision to change to a job with our without benefits is driven by a change in  
expected traits, εit in the wage equation.  This corresponds to the error of the martingale 
process  for  the  evolution  of  expected  ability.  As  a  result,  the  benefits  variables  are 
correlated with the error term of the wage equation  
and need to be instrumented as well. 
 
The set of instruments Zi has to satisfy the following first moment condition: 
                                                                                                            (7) 
Using the Generalized Method of Moment estimator provides consistent and efficient 
estimates of the coefficients. The objective function for the estimations can be written as: 
 
                                                (8) 
Where  Z’Z  is  the  covariance  matrix  of  the  vector  of  moments  Z’e(),    is  the 
covariance  matrix  of  the  error  term  eit  and    is  the  vector  of  parameters.  Obtaining 
efficient estimates requires a two-step procedure in which the first step estimates the 




Following previous studies that use this econometric approach, we use instruments based 
on the lags of the benefits choice variables. The strict exogeneity condition for the panel 
data estimator implies that current and lagged values of the right hand side variables are 
uncorrelated with the error term  it  of  the  wage  equation  (5).  We  use  two  sets  of 
                                                 
19 Quasi-differencing consists in isolating θ
e
it in equation (5) and use the martingale equation (6) to link the  
wage equations at t and t-1.  
20 Note that for the parameters to be identified, the optimization problem (8) needs the constraint that 
θ
e
it in the error term of equation (5) sums to zero overall individuals and time periods. Explanation and a 




instruments. First, to instrument for lagged wages, we use the interactions between the 
lag of the benefit variables and the skill index. The interaction between the worker’s 
skills and his or her choice of benefits is likely to be a good predictor of wages given the 
definition of wages in (1) and (2) which assumes that skills are differentially rewarded 
across benefit sectors.  
 
Second, we need to instrument for the current period benefit choice correlated with it in 
the error term of equation (6). We use as instruments, the interactions between the first 
and the second lags of the benefits variables. These interactions capture workers’ job 
transitions prior to the current period resulting from previous period beliefs about the 
worker’s expected individual trait. If for example, previous period beliefs were high, they 
may have led the worker to choose a job with benefits. As a result, these previous period 
job  transitions  help  convey  information  about  prior  beliefs  of  individual  trait  which 
should be a good predictor of current expected beliefs and therefore current choice of 
benefits. Note also that because beliefs follow a martingale, changes in prior beliefs (it-1) 
are not correlated with the new information in the current period from observing current 
worker productivity (it) and are therefore not correlated with the error term of the wage 
equation.















   
Lagged Log Wage  8.69  1.73 
  (0.000)  (0.009) 
Not Offered/Held      Other Benefits  71.03  3.41 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Offered/Held        No Other Benefits  20.38  5.36 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Offered/Held             Other Benefits  49.56  3.21 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Notes: 





                                                 
21 We also added interactions between benefits and worker experience to capture the impact of the variance 
of θi which enters the residual of the wage equation when the log of wages is used. See Gibbons, Katz, 
Lemieux and Parent (2005) for details about the wage equation when wages are considered in logs. 